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THE FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
By: Samantha McKay 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The United States passport represents global freedom and opportunity.1  It is ranked as 
the number one most powerful passport, and along with it comes one of the most coveted 
citizenships in the world.2  Why, then, have more Americans than ever before decided to give it 
all up?  In 2015, a record breaking 4,279 Americans renounced their U.S. citizenship.3  These 
numbers do not represent a gradual increase, but a sudden spike in expatriates. While past 
decades have averaged at about 500 expatriates yearly, recent years have experienced an increase 
in upwards of 100% of Americans renouncing their citizenship.4  Although it is not entirely clear 
why the number of expatriates has increased so drastically in recent years, some experts attribute 
this activity to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).5 
 FATCA was enacted in 2010 with the objective of preventing tax evasion by U.S. 
taxpayers with offshore accounts, or more specifically, “the deliberate and illegal hiding of assets 
                                                          
1 The United States passport offers citizens the global freedom and opportunity to travel to 147 different countries. 
PASSPORT INDEX, https://www.passportindex.org/byRank.php (last updated 2015). 
2 Id. The United States passport is tied with the United Kingdom as the number 1 most powerful passport, each 
offering passport holders the ability to travel to 147 different countries.   
3 Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 26,618 (May 8, 2015); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required 
by Section 6039G, 80 Fed. Reg. 45,709 (July 31, 2015); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen 
to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,851 (Oct. 27, 2015); Quarterly Publication of 
Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 81 Fed. Reg. 6,598 (Jan. 8, 2016). 
4 In 2009, the number of published expatriates was 742.  This number increased by 106% in 2010 with 1,534 
expatriates.  In 2011 the number of expatriates again increased, this time by 16% to 1,781 expatriates.  2012 
resulted in a 47% decrease with 932 expatriates.  The number again increased to 2,999 expatriates in 2013.  This 
was a 221% increase from 2012 and a 68% increase from previous high of 2011.  The number of expatriates 
continued to grow in 2014 by 13% with 3,415 expatriates, and again by 25% in 2015 with 4,279 expatriates in 
2015.  From 2009 to 2015, there has been a 476% increase in expatriates with every year after 2010 setting a new 
record high with the exception of 2012.  Ryan E. Dunn & Andrew Mitchel, New Expatriate Record for 2015 – 
Nearly 4,300 Expatriations, INT’L TAX BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), 
http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/2016/02/new-expatriate-record-2015-nearly-4300-expatriations.html. 
5 Record number of Americans living abroad renounce citizenship, RT QUESTION MORE, 
https://www.rt.com/usa/256921-Americans-renounce-us-citizenship/ (May 8, 2015); 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1474. 
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and income from the IRS by U.S. citizens and residents.”6  It achieves this goal by imposing 
reporting requirements on individuals with assets in foreign accounts, and on foreign financial 
institutions with American account holders.7  
 FATCA was crafted as a solution to the global problem of tax evasion.  It is estimated 
that an excess of $100 billion of tax revenue are lost annually due to tax evasion.8  The United 
States collects income taxes through a “voluntary compliance” program, in which taxpayers self-
assess the amount of taxes owed, self-report the amounts by filing the appropriate forms, and 
make payments to cover said liability.9  It is enforced primarily through withholding procedures 
that typically require employers to retain a portion of the taxpayer’s wages and submit it directly 
to the IRS, which then applies these withheld amounts against the taxpayer’s tax obligation.10  
Unfortunately, this system of self-assessment has led to compliance problems such as non-filing, 
underpayment, and underreporting, resulting in a “tax gap” made of the difference between taxes 
owed and taxes actually collected by the IRS each year.11 Several high profile prosecutions have 
brought an increased public awareness to the glitches with voluntary compliance, such as the 
controversy of the Union Bank of Switzerland (“UBS”), which revealed “nearly $20 billion in 
                                                          
6 Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Select Rev. Measures of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means [hereinafter Hearing], 111th Cong. 13 (2009). 
7 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA (last updated July 15, 
2015).  The details of the exact reporting requirements of FATCA on both foreign financial institutions and on 
individuals will be discussed infra section III. A. 
8 Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1 
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf.  
9 Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better to 
Comply Than to Opt Out, 39 J. CORP. L. 155, 158 (2013). 
10 Id. (“Withholding has proven to be the single most effective enforcement mechanism for collecting taxes on 
income from labor.” (quoting Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the United States and Germany, 10 
FLA. TAX REV. 315, 323 (2011))). 
11 Id.  
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hidden assets, 52,000 secret bank accounts, confidential informants, court proceedings, and a 
$780 million fine.”12 
 Despite the colossal necessity to thwart offshore tax evasion, not all have welcomed 
FATCA with open arms.  Its enactment has resulted in public outcry, with many claiming that 
FATCA is unnecessarily burdensome and detrimental to taxpayer rights.13  It is allegedly 
responsible for the vast increase of expatriates in the years following its enactment.14  It is also 
claimed to have resulted in many foreign financial institutions closing the accounts of U.S. 
citizens to escape the burdens of complying with FATCA reporting requirements.15  In addition 
to the general public outcry in response to its enactment, FATCA has also been challenged as 
unconstitutional.16 
 This note will examine the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and analyze its 
constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment.  Part II will discuss the events that led to the need 
for the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, centered on international tax evasion and the 
inadequacies of previous attempts to curb said evasion.  Part III will illustrate the details of 
Congress’s response to tax evasion through its enactment of FATCA, and discuss the public 
response to its implementation.  Part IV will analyze the constitutionality of FATCA under the 
Fourth Amendment and argue that FATCA is an unreasonable search.  Finally, Part V will offer 
a solution to the constitutional conundrum created by FATCA’s reporting requirements. 
                                                          
12 Niels Jense, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1823, 1824 (2010).  
13 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2016 Annual Objectives Report to Congress, 48  
The IRS’s Implementation of FATCA Has in Some Cases Imposed Unnecessary Burdens and Failed to Protect the 
Rights of Affected Taxpayers. http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-
JRC/Volume_1.pdf. 
14 Taylor Denson, Goodbye, Uncle Sam? How the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act is Causing a Drastic 
Increase in the Number of Americans Renouncing Their Citizenship, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 967, 979 (2015). 
15 Id at 969-970.  
16 Crawford v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 3:15-CV-250, 2015 WL 5697552 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 
2015). 
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II. The Need for FATCA 
 FATCA was drafted as a response to the need for global tax transparency.17  In recent 
years, several events have increased public awareness regarding just how severe offshore tax 
evasion has become.  This section will illustrate these events that gave rise to the need and 
implementation of FATCA.  It will discuss the global problem of tax evasion, including the 
scandals that gave rise to the public awareness and political response to curb tax evasion.  This 
section will also describe previous tax reporting requirements and their inadequacies to stop 
offshore tax evasion. 
A. Tax Evasion 
 The United States asserts a broad taxing jurisdiction.18  It is the only economically 
developed country that practices citizenship-based taxation.19  Many U.S. taxpayers avoid these 
taxes through the use of offshore accounts in other jurisdictions.20  Offshore tax evasion has led 
to an estimated loss of anywhere from $40 billion to upwards of $100 billion of revenue each 
year.21 
                                                          
17 Hearing, supra note 6, at 7.  
18 Ann C. Kossachev, Worldwide Taxation and FATCA: A Constitutional Conundrum or The Final Piece of The Tax 
Evasion Puzzle, 25 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 217, 229 (2015).  “Congress is given broad discretion to enact 
laws or engage in activities that assist in the execution of the powers in the Constitution through the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Clause 1 of Article 1, Section 8 grants Congress the taxing power; and ‘the phrase to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare by any means.’” 
19 Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 111-112 (2015).  “[I]n addition to those physically 
present, and contrary to the practice of other countries, the United States also taxes its citizens and lawful permanent 
residents (green-card holders) on their worldwide income, no matter where in the world they reside and no matter 
how long they reside there.  Thus, when nationals of other countries move abroad, sooner or later their state of 
nationality stops taxing them.  But the United States never stops taxing its citizens and green-card holders, no matter 
how long they lived abroad.”   
20 Gravelle, supra note 8, at 1.  
21 It is difficult to estimate an exact loss of revenue from individual tax evasion “because the initial basis of the 
estimate is the amount of assets held abroad whose income is not yet reported to the tax authorities.  In addition to 
this estimate, the expected rate of return and tax rate are needed to estimate the revenue cost.”  Different estimates 
have been made by experts using different rates of return and tax rates.  An estimate by Joseph Guttentag and Avi-
Yonah determined a $50 billion loss, while the Tax Justice Network determined an estimate close to a $100 billion 
loss.  Gravelle, supra note 8, at 27. 
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 The primary incentive for using other jurisdictions to evade taxes stems from the fact that 
other countries either do not impose an income tax or levy it at a low rate, encouraging 
foreigners to keep income in their banks.22  In addition, the banking secrecy and privacy laws of 
foreign countries differ.23  Some of these privacy laws protect the identity of its account holders, 
“creating a secure and tax-evasion friendly sanctuary for those subject to U.S. and other nations’ 
tax laws.”24 
 Avoiding reporting income is easily done through the use of offshore accounts in a 
secretive jurisdiction with low tax.25  A common technique is to simply open an account in a 
foreign bank or purchase foreign investments outside of the U.S. and not report the income.26  
Additionally, trusts or shell corporations could be created to “take advantage of U.S. tax laws 
that exempt interest income and capital gains of non-residents from U.S. tax.”27  The utilization 
of these tax havens create loopholes that aid U.S. taxpayers in evading taxes, despite the efforts 
of the IRS to compel compliance, as described below.   
B. Inadequacies of Prior Compliance Efforts 
 Offshore tax evasion is not a new practice.28  However, the IRS has had little success in 
its prior efforts to realize offshore account tax compliance.  This is because the U.S. relies on the 
                                                          
22 Melissa A. Dizdarevic, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going Where No Withholding Has Gone 
Before, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2967, 2972 (2011). 
23 Id. 
24 Bruce W. Bean & Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: American Legal 
Imperialism?, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333, 338 (2015). 
25 Dizdarevic, supra note 22, at 2973.  Jurisdictions with low or no taxes and secretive privacy or banking laws that 
U.S. citizens use as loopholes to evade U.S. taxes are referred to as “tax havens.” Gravelle, supra note 8, at 3. 
26 Gravelle, supra note 8, at 24. 
27 Id. 
28 The use of offshore tax evasion can be traced back as early as 1937 from a Letter to President Roosevelt in which 
the U.S. Secretary of Treasury describes the “principal devices now being employed by taxpayers with large 
incomes for the purpose of defeating the income taxes which would normally be payable by them.” See, Letter from 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of U.S. (May 29, 1937), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15413axzz1qRIOpHZ8.  
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voluntary compliance of its citizens to determine tax liabilities on foreign-held money.29  Many 
U.S. taxpayers with international income do not comply with reporting requirements, either 
intentionally or due to a lack of understanding of their reporting obligations.30  Efforts of the IRS 
to determine the accuracy of tax filings are further hindered by the local laws of other nations 
that protect banking secrecy and information privacy.31  This section will describe the 
enforcement tools in place prior to FATCA and their inadequacies in effectively compelling 
compliance. 
 The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (“FBAR”) is a form that a U.S. 
taxpayer must complete annually if he has one or more foreign accounts with an aggregate value 
exceeding $10,000 during a year.32  The form is filed directly with the Department of Treasury, 
and is done separately from the form 8938 that must be filed with the taxpayer’s income tax 
return.33  The FBAR requires subjected taxpayers to list and provide information about all of 
their foreign accounts, and failure to file an FBAR results in fines and penalties.34  However, 
                                                          
29 Heukelom, supra note 9, at 157. 
30 U.S. taxpayers are required to report income earned through financial activity in offshore jurisdictions.  They are 
also obligated to report any assets held outside of the U.S. with an aggregate value greater than $10,000.  Many 
Americans are unaware of this requirement.  Denson, supra note 14, at 975. 
31 Yvonne Woldeab, “Americans: We Love You, But We Cant Afford You”: How the Costly U.S.-Canada FATCA 
Agreement Permits Discrimination of Americans in Violation of International Law, 30 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 611, 
618 (2015). 
32 31 C.F.R. §§103.24-27 (2010); FBAR is mandated by the Bank Secrecy Act, which requires individuals to report 
identities and relationships of parties involved in transactions with foreign financial entities. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 
(2006).  Exceptions to the Reporting Requirement include: Certain foreign financial accounts jointly owned by 
spouses; United States persons included in a consolidated FBAR; Correspondent/Nostro accounts; Foreign financial 
accounts owned by a government entity; Foreign financial accounts owned by an international financial institution; 
Owners and beneficiaries of U.S. IRAs; Participants in and beneficiaries of tax-qualified retirement plans; Certain 
individuals with signature authority over, but no financial interest in, a foreign financial account; Trust beneficiaries 
if a U.S. person reports the account on an FBAR filed on behalf of the trust; and foreign financial accounts 
maintained on a United States military banking facility.  Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Report-of-
Foreign-Bank-and-Financial-Accounts-FBAR (last updated Dec. 11, 2015). 
33 Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, supra note 32.  
34 Failure to file a complete and/or accurate FBAR are subject to a penalty not to exceed $10,000 per violation that is 
nonwillful and not due to reasonable cause.  For each willful violations, the penalty increases to the greater of 
$100,000 or 50 percent of the balance in the account at the time of the violation. Id. 
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since the FBAR relies on self-reporting, it has been ineffective in its efforts with taxpayer 
compliance.35 
 The Qualified Intermediary Program attempted to enlist the participation of foreign banks 
to help the IRS achieve its compliance goals.36  The program involves voluntary agreements 
between foreign banks and the IRS, in which the participating banks withhold and report the 
appropriate amount of tax of its U.S. account holders.37  While it appeared to be on the right 
track by incentivizing banks to withhold and report, instead of relying on the self-reporting 
method, the Qualified Intermediary Program has not effectively accomplished its goals.  Many 
loopholes were found that allowed the foreign banks to aid their U.S. clients in avoiding 
reporting requirements, as illustrated in the section below.38  
C. Tax Evasion Scandals 
 The inadequacy of these previous tools used to realize tax compliance is displayed by the 
highly publicized scandals that took place in 2008.  These scandals brought tax evasion into the 
public eye and confirmed the need for a new solution to effectively increase compliance.  For 
example, in February 2008, German tax authorities shared customer account information 
purchased from an employee at Liechtenstein Global Trust (“LGT”).39  This resulted in the 
prosecution of over 100 U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts at LGT.40 
                                                          
35 Woldeab, supra note 31, at 619.  
36 Diszdarevic, supra note 22, at 2978. 
37 See generally, Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1 (1997). 
38 Bean & Wright, supra note 24, at 340. 
39 An employee at LGT, Heinrich Kieber, “sold a DVD containing the details of 2,000 client accounts worth more 
than €4 billion for a reported €4.2 million ($6.47 million).”  Leichtenstein Tax Evasion Scandal: Informant in 
German Investigation ‘Fears’ for his Life, SPEIGEL ONLINE INT’L (March 8, 2008, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/liechtenstein-tax-evasion-scandal-informant-in-german-investigation-
fears-for-his-life-a-540283.html. 
40 IRS and Tax Treaty Partners Target Liechtenstein Accounts, IRS NEWSWIRE (Feb. 26, 2008), 
http://www.assetsearchblog.com/uploads/file/IRS%20and%20Tax%20Treaty%20Partners%20Target%20Liechtenst
ein%20Accounts.pdf. 
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 Closely following the LGT scandal was the UBS scandal.  In May 2008, a former banker 
from the Union Bank of Switzerland was arrested and pleaded guilty to helping U.S. account 
holders evade U.S. taxes through their offshore accounts.41  The guilty plea exposed a 
remarkable tax evasion scheme that UBS bankers used to protect their clients from U.S. 
detection, which included bankers smuggling diamonds in toothpaste tubes, encrypted 
computers, code words, and other “spy-like” techniques.42  A highly publicized investigation 
revealed secret accounts held by 19,000 Americans.43  Through the aid of UBS bankers, these 
secret U.S. accounts held a collective $20 billion.44  The DOJ settled with UBS for a $780 
million fine.45  In addition, the bank also agreed to disclose information on 4,450 secret 
accounts.46  Together, these scandals revealed the massive problem with offshore tax evasion and 
led to the legislative response of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. 
III. Legislative Response to Tax Evasion: The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
 FATCA was created as a legislative response to tax evasion.  It is the frontrunner in the 
battle against offshore tax avoidance, and was developed as a “result of a growing public 
                                                          
41 Bradley Birkenfeld pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States on June 19, 2008 and was sentenced 
to 40 months incarceration.  Former UBS Banker Sentenced to 40 Months for Aiding Billionaire American Evade 
Taxes, THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Aug. 21, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-ubs-banker-
sentenced-40-months-aiding-billionaire-american-evade-taxes.  In 2007, Birkenfeld came forward under the IRS’s 
whistleblower program and had been providing the IRS with information for months.  However, his failure to 
disclose information on one of his largest accounts, belonging to Igor Olenicoff, resulted in his prosecution and 
prison sentence.  J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and its Potential 
Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 476 (2012).   
42 See, generally, Lisa Jucca, Special Report: How the U.S. cracked open secret vaults at UBS, REUTERS, (Apr. 9, 
2010, 6:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-ubs-idUSTRE6380UA20100409; A Swiss banker on trial 
A day of reckoning?, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-
finance/21625354-what-was-raouls-role; Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion, NY 
TIMES, (June 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/business/20tax.html.  
43 Lynnley Browning, Pressured by I.R.S., UBS Is Closing Secret Accounts, NY Times, (Jan. 8, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/business/09ubs.html.  
44 David S. Hilzenrath & Zachary A. Goldfarb, UBS to Pay $780 Million Over U.S. Tax Charges, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/18/AR2009021802541.html.  
45 UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement, THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Feb. 18, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-enters-deferred-prosecution-agreement.  
46 Jason Ryan, Secret No More: UBS to Divulge 4450 U.S. Client Names to Fraud Probers, ABC NEWS, (Aug. 19, 
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=8363725.  
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awareness of the failures of prior international tax collection efforts.” 47 Its primary objective is 
to deter illegal hiding of assets and income and, as a result, raise revenue otherwise lost to 
offshore tax avoidance.48  This section will describe the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.  
First, it will explain, in detail, the provisions that make up FATCA.  Next, it will illustrate 
various responses that have transpired since its enactment. 
A. Details of FATCA 
 FATCA was designed to establish a “seamless global enforcement network that will be 
difficult to circumvent.”49  Its enactment introduced §§ 1471-1474 and § 6038D to the Internal 
Revenue Code.50  It aims to accomplish its goals of tax compliance by commanding the 
disclosure of U.S. taxpayers’ foreign accounts directly to the IRS by the foreign financial 
institutions where the U.S. accounts are held.51  Disclosure is required on the individual level, as 
well as by foreign financial institutions.52  Failure to disclose will result in penalties to both the 
taxpayers and the financial institutions.53   
1. Individual Reporting 
 Disclosure on the individual level relies on voluntary compliance from U.S. taxpayers 
holding certain foreign accounts.54  Specifically, §6038D of the Internal Revenue Code requires 
the disclosure of those U.S. taxpayers holding an interest in a “specified foreign financial asset” 
                                                          
47 Sean Deneault, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 24 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 729, 733 (2014).  
48 Dizdarevic, supra note 22, at 2984-2985. 
49 Peter Nelson, Conflicts of Interest: Resolving Legal Barriers to the Implementation of the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act, 32 VA. TAX REV. 387, 394 (2012). 
50 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501-35, 124 Stat. 71, 97-115 (2010).  
51 Hearing, supra note 6, at 3. 
52 See, 26 U.S.C. §6038D(a) (2010) for individual reporting requirements; See, also 26 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (2010) for 
FFI reporting requirements. 
53 See, 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(d) (2010) for the penalty for an individual’s failure to disclose; see, also 26 U.S.C. 
§1471(a) for the withholding tax on FFIs.   
54 “Any individual who, during any taxable year, holds any interest in a specified foreign financial asset shall attach 
to such person’s return of tax imposed by subtitle A for such taxable year the information described in subsection (c) 
with respect to each such asset if the aggregate value of all such assets exceeds $50,000 (or such higher dollar 
amount as the Secretary may prescribe)” 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(a)(2010). 
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with an aggregate value that exceeds $50,000 during the taxable year.55  A specified foreign 
financial asset is further defined as “any financial account maintained by a foreign financial 
institution” as well as some assets not held or maintained by a financial institution, including 
“any stock or security issued by a person other than a United States person, any financial 
instrument or contract held for investment that has an issuer or counterparty which is other than a 
United States person, and any interest in a foreign entity.”56 
 In addition to the maximum value of the foreign asset during the taxable year, the 
information that must be disclosed for any foreign account includes the name and address of the 
financial institution that houses the account, as well as the account number.57  In regards to 
stocks or securities, taxpayers must reveal the name and address of the issuer and any 
information necessary to determine the class or issue of which the stock or security is a part.58  
Additionally, in the case of other instruments, contracts, or interests, the taxpayer must disclose 
any information necessary to identify the instrument, contract, or interest, as well as the names 
and addresses of all issuers and counterparties.59 
 The disclosure must be reported on an IRS form that is attached to the taxpayer’s annual 
income tax return.60  This reporting requirement is done in addition to reporting required under 
FBAR, which can result in some duplicative reporting.61  However, the FATCA requirements are 
much broader in scope in regards to the types of assets that must be reported.62 
                                                          
55 Id. 
56 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(b) (2010). 
57 26 U.S.C. §6038D(c) (2010). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 IRS Form 8939, IRS, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8938.pdf; 2015 Instructions for Form 8938 
Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, (Oct. 22, 
2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8938.pdf.  
61 See, generally, Recommendations for Published Guidance under IRC §§ 6038D and 1471: Eliminate Duplicative 
Reporting of Assets on the FATCA form 8938 if the Asset is Reported or Reflected on the FBAR (FinCEN Report 
114) and Exclude Financial Accounts Maintained by a Financial Institution in the Country of Which the U.S. Person 
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 An individual’s failure to report the necessary disclosures will result in a penalty of 
$10,000.63  Furthermore, if the failure to disclose continues for more than 90 days after the 
individual receives notice of such failure, the individual will receive an additional penalty of 
$10,000 for every 30-day period of continued failure, not to exceed $50,000.64  However, the 
penalty may be waived if the failure to disclose is shown “to be due to reasonable cause and not 
due to willful neglect.”65 
2. FFI Reporting 
 The voluntary compliance by U.S. individual taxpayers is reinforced through the 
mandated participation of Foreign Financial Institutions (“FFIs”).66  By using the information 
that comes from FFIs holding the U.S. taxpayer’s account, the IRS is able to verify the 
information supplied by the taxpayers.67 
 A foreign financial institution is defined as “any financial institution which is a foreign 
entity.”68  Further, a financial institution is defined as any entity that accepts deposits in the 
ordinary course of a banking or similar business; as a substantial portion of its business, holds 
financial assets for the accounts of others; or is engaged primarily in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, or trading securities, partnership interests, commodities, or any interest [thereof].”69  
Essentially, the FFI has been broadly defined in order to include all foreign-owned entities 
involved in financial business.  This was done so with the intention to make it “difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
is a Bona Fide Resident from FATCA Reporting, Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, (Apr. 13, 2015) available at 
https://www.americansabroad.org/media/files/files/0400d365/tax-advocate-recommendations-13-april-2015.pdf.    
62  See, generally, Comparison of Form 8938 and FBAR Requirements, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Comparison-of-Form-8938-and-FBAR-Requirements (last updated March 25, 2016). 
63 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(d) (2010).  
64 Id.  
65 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(g) (2010). 
66 Dizdarevic, supra note 22, at 2977. 
67 Id.  
68 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(4) (2010). 
69 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(5) (2010). 
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imagine a financial institution that could offer tax avoidance strategies similar to those peddled 
by UBS without falling into coverage of the statute.”70  In addition to the required FFI reporting, 
FATCA also reaches some Non-Financial Foreign Entities (“NFFEs”).71  A NFFE is defined as 
“any foreign entity which is not a financial institution,” broadening the reach of FATCA even 
further.72 
 Broadly speaking, in order to comply with FATCA, participating FFIs must enter into 
agreements with the IRS, and report information about its U.S. accounts directly to the IRS.73  
This first requires FFIs to categorize their accounts based on a determination of which qualify as 
“U.S. Reportable Accounts.”74  To do so, each FFI must search its existing accounts, and 
perform extensive due diligence on new customers for indicia associating the account with a U.S. 
person.75  The FFI must then report to the IRS the identifying information of the account holders, 
such as the account numbers, the account balances, as well as gross receipts and withdrawals or 
payments from the account.76  In addition to the initial information report, FFIs must 
continuously track the U.S. accounts throughout the life of the account and report this 
information on an annual basis.77 
                                                          
70 Nelson, supra note 48, at 392-393. 
71 26 U.S.C. § 1472 (2010).  
72 26 U.S.C. § 1472(d) (2010). 
73 78 Fed. Reg. at 5874. 
74 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [FATCA Partner] to 
Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Reciprocal-Model-1A-Agreement-
Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-6-6-14.pdf.  “’U.S. Reportable Account’ means a financial Account maintained by a 
Reporting [FATCA Partner] Financial Institution and held by one or more Specified U.S. Persons or by a Non-U.S. 
Entity with one or more Controlling Persons that is a Specified U.S. Person.”  
75 Annex I: Due Dilligence Obligations for Identifying and Reporting on U.S. Reportable Accounts and on Payments 
to Certain Nonparticipating Financial Institutions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Annex-I-to-Model-1-Agreement-
11-4-13.pdf.  
76 26 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (2010).  
77 26 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(1)(C) (2010). 
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 If an FFI refuses to enter into such an agreement with the IRS or fails to report certain 
information on U.S. accounts, they must face a penalty, in which thirty percent of all 
withholdable payments is deducted by a withholding agent.78  A withholdable payment is 
essentially any U.S.-source monetary transfer that an FFI depends on for business.79  
Furthermore, a withholding agent is defined as “all persons, in whatever capacity acting, having 
the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of any withholdable payment.”80 
 The withholding penalty was defined broadly as a way to effectively compel compliance 
and make it nearly impossible for FFIs to aid U.S. persons in tax evasion.81  FATCA “offers 
foreign banks a simple choice – if you wish to access our capital markets, you have to report on 
U.S. account holders.”82  The penalty may be steep, but it is designed as a way to compel 
compliance by taxpayers rather than to collect from them.  It has been noted that IRS officials 
would consider the withholding requirement a success even if they do not collect “a dollar of 
withholding tax,” as long as it “helps to establish taxpayer trust in fairness of the system.”83 
 In addition to the withholding penalty on nonparticipating FFIs, FATCA requires 
participating FFIs to deduct a similar thirty percent tax on withholdable payments passing 
through the FFI en route to noncompliant individuals and entities.84  The “passthru” payment is 
defined broadly to “cover payments that are not U.S.-source in the strict legal sense of the term, 
                                                          
78 Id.  
79  26 U.S.C. § 1473(1) (2010).  
80 26 U.S.C. § 1473(4) (2010). 
81 See, Nelson, supra note 49, at 395.  
82 Press Release, U.S. CONG., Baucus, Rangel, Kerry, Neal Improve Plan to Tackle Offshore Tax Abuse Through 
Increased Transparency, Enhanced Reporting and Stronger Penalties (Oct. 27, 2009) available at 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-216074212.html.  
83 Alison Bennett, Tax Havens: Musher Says IRS Focused on Timelines, Burden in Implementing FATCA 
Provisions, 79 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-2 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at 
http://news.bna.com/dtln/DTLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=17022177&vname=dtrnot&fcn=7&wsn=793670000&
fn=17022177&split=0 (subscription required). IRS Associate Chief Counsel, Steven Musher explained that a main 
goal is to “reconfirm the trust that taxpayers have in the international regime.”  Since its enactment, my research 
leads be to believe that statistics have not yet been released on whether any withholding taxes have been collected.  
84 26 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D) (2010).  “The term ‘passthru payment’ means any withholdable payment or other 
payment to the extent attributable to a withholdable payment.” 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(7) (2010). 
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but are at least partially attributable to income generated in the country.”85  The provision is used 
to prevent participating FFIs to allow nonparticipating FFIs and recalcitrant account holders to 
invest in the U.S. markets without complying with FATCA.86 
3. Intergovernmental Agreements 
 In order to prevent FFIs from violating local laws, the Treasury has made over 100 
intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”) with authorities of foreign nations.87  “The 
intergovernmental approach intends to remove legal impediments to FATCA compliance and 
reduces the anticipated financial burdens of compliance for foreign banks in the countries that 
make agreements.”88  Different variations of Model IGAs have been created to use in an effort of 
collaboration with foreign governments to “ensure that the objectives of FATCA are fully met, 
regardless of bank secrecy laws.”89 
 Under the Model I IGA, instead of reporting directly to the IRS, FFIs provide the 
information to their government, which in turn discloses the appropriate information to the IRS. 
This agreement can be made reciprocal, where the U.S. would also agree to report information 
on foreigners’ bank accounts held in the United States.90  Alternatively, the Model II IGA 
requires direct reporting by FFIs to the IRS.91 
                                                          
85 Nelson, supra note 49, at 397. 
86 Id. “If an account holder fails to provide sufficient information for an FFI to fulfill its reporting obligations, the 
account holder will be deemed ‘recalcitrant’ and will be subject to the punitive withholding tax” Id. at 394.  
87 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act Resource Center, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last updated March 24, 2016 4:33 
PM). [hereinafter Resource Center].  
88 Frederic Behrens, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 205, 
215 (2013).   
89 Bean & Wright, supra note 24, at 352. 
90 U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA 
13 (2012), available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf.  
91 U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA 
[Non-Reciprocal Version] (2012), available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf.  
 15 
 The IGAs are negotiated in order to allow FATCA’s enforcement without violating other 
countries’ domestic laws, such as bank secrecy or privacy laws.92  The IGAs are a way to get the 
full effect of FATCA.  In order to ensure worldwide compliance with FATCA, a potential 190 
different IGAs would need to be negotiated between the U.S. and other nations.93  Currently, 112 
countries have signed IGAs.94 
B. Responses to the Legislature 
 While it is clear that something had to be done about offshore tax evasion FATCA has 
received a variety of criticisms since its enactment.  This section will explore the public outcry 
that has occurred, as well as a recent constitutional challenge to FATCA.  
1. Initial Public Outcry 
 Since the enactment of FATCA, many concerns and criticisms have evolved.  One of 
those criticisms is that FATCA will have a potentially harmful impact on the U.S. capital market.  
Many FFIs have found that the easiest way to comply with FATCA, and avoid the thirty percent 
withholding penalty, is to withdraw from the U.S. markets altogether.95  Upon the enactment of 
FATCA, a survey conducted by KPMG in 2011 revealed that, of the financial institutions polled, 
39 percent have stated that they would either definitely, or potentially disinvest from the U.S. 
market.96  Since the American economy is dependent on foreign investments, FATCA may put 
the United States at a disadvantage in the global market.97 
                                                          
92 Behrens, supra note 88, at 215. 
93 Id. at 216. 
94 Resource Center, supra note 87.  
95 Behrens, supra note 88, at 219. 
96 In 2011, KPMG conducted a survey of leading fund promoters in 12 countries.  The majority of respondents had 
assets under management in excess of €10 billion, and more than half of the respondents distributed their shares in 
more than 10 countries.  When asked if “[f]urther to FATCA, could your fund intend to disinvest from the U.S. 
equity market?” 42% responded “No”; 26% responded “Depends on the detailed implementation rules”; 7% 
responded “It is thinkable”; 6% responded “Yes”; and 19% did not answer. FATCA and the funds industry: Defining 
the path, KPMG (June 2011) available at 
https://www.kpmg.com/BB/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/fatca-and-the-funds-industry-
defining-the-path.pdf.  My research has led me to believe that since FATCA has gone into effect, there has not yet 
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 The implementation of FATCA has also resulted in the potential disparate treatment of 
U.S. persons living abroad.  While most Americans living abroad will not owe any U.S. taxes 
due to the special deductions and exclusions, they must still file a tax return in both the country 
they reside as well as the U.S., which can lead to the possibility of double taxation.98  While 
FATCA was intended to target Americans evading taxes through the use of offshore accounts, 
more will fall under the statute’s reach, including many Americans living abroad.99  Due to the 
harsh penalties of FATCA, Americans living abroad who hold foreign accounts have a high risk 
in any mistakes with filings.100  Therefore, Americans living abroad must endure high expenses 
to retain tax consultants in order to ensure a correctly filed U.S. tax return.101 
 “Accidental Americans” may also be subject to FATCA unknowingly.102  All persons 
born in the United States are deemed U.S. citizens, as are children born outside of the U.S. to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
been any evidence of disinvestment from the U.S. markets, nor has there been done any studies or surveys similar to 
KMPG’s original survey.   
97 Behrens, supra note 88, at 218. 
98 The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion and the Foreign Housing Exclusion/Deduction are available to overseas 
Americans to help minimize the possibility of double taxation.  In order to qualify for these deductions, taxpayers 
must meet wither the bona fide residence test, which is an American citizen who establishes his residence in a 
foreign country for an uninterrupted period during the taxable year, or the physical presence test, which requires the 
U.S. citizen’s physical presence in a foreign country for 330 days in twelve consecutive months.  Americans 
experience double taxation when a taxpayer’s gross income exceeds the amount of excludable foreign-earned 
income.  Denson, supra note 14, at 973.  “While almost 82 percent of all Americans living abroad who filed their 
returns with the IRS owed no taxes, there is still the possibility that they can face double taxation.” Deneault, supra 
note 47, at 758.  
99 American Citizens Abroad, et al., Residence-Based Taxation: A Necessary and Urgent Tax Reform, 4 OVERSEAS 
AMERICANS WEEK 2013, archived at http://perma.cc/7RDC-3DJH. 
100 Id. at 5.  
101 Id. “For Americans abroad, U.S. tax filing is highly complicated, as foreign currencies must be converted into 
U.S. dollars and foreign transactions and arrangements must be interpreted according to U.S. tax law.  To ensure 
compliance with U.S. tax law, overseas tax filers generally engage a tax lawyer or accountant knowledgeable in both 
local and U.S. tax systems.  Such specialists are expensive and in many countries are almost impossible to find.  
Though most overseas filers owe no U.S. taxes, they end up paying significant compliance fees because of the 
complexity of the filings and because they receive little help from the IRS” 
102 See, generally, Allison Christians, Understanding the Accidental American: Tina’s Story, TAX ANALYSTS (Dec. 
8, 2015), 
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Features/4B25BA71D312B2D285257F1500682E46?OpenDocument
.  Americans living abroad have different reporting thresholds than those living in the U.S.  Americans living abroad 
must make the required FATCA disclosures when they have an aggregate value of $200,000 as opposed to the 
$50,000 threshold of individuals living in the United States.  Summary of FATCA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, 
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American parents.103  This rule subjects incidental citizens to FATCA, regardless of when they 
left the U.S., some of which may not even know that they are considered a U.S. citizen.104  This 
may also bring FFIs unknowingly under the statute by having unaware “accidental” American 
account holders at their institution.105  In addition to Americans living abroad, FATCA reaches 
even further to non-U.S. citizens.  For example, all customers of participating FFIs, regardless of 
their connection to the U.S., must prove that they are not a U.S. person.106 
 Americans living abroad may also face unfair treatment from the countries in which they 
reside.  Since disinvesting from the U.S. markets is not financially feasible for most FFIs, a 
number of them have decided to limit or terminate the services they offer to U.S. citizens.107  
Some banks would rather drop all of their American clients than report according to the strict 
standards under FATCA.108  This has an incredibly disparate effect on Americans living abroad, 
who are finding themselves unable to go on about their lives normally while living abroad, due 
to the lack of access to banks or mortgages.  This has led many to renounce their U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-FATCA-Reporting-for-
U.S.-Taxpayers (last updated Nov. 4, 2015).  
103 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(d) (2012).  
104 Bean & Wright, supra note 24, at 353.  While there are exceptions to overseas Americans and “accidental 
Americans,” if one is not aware of his or her status as a U.S. citizen, they may be unaware of their responsibilities 
and consequently the application of these exceptions.   Upon finding out that one is an American citizen, there are 
steps an individual must take.  “To avoid breaking any laws [individuals] will have to renounce his US citizenship 
and file five years’ worth of tax returns as well as possibly thousands of dollars to the US government in taxes on 
income he earned [abroad]” Siri Srinivas, ‘I was terrified we’d lose all our money’: banks tell US customers they 
won’t work with Americans, The Guardian, (Sept. 24, 2014) 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/sep/24/americans-chased-by-irs-give-up-citizenship-after-being-forced-
out-of-bank-accounts.    
105 Bean & Wright, supra note 24, at 354.  If a customer is unaware of his or her status as an American citizen, it 
may be difficult for the FFI to make the determination for each of its customers.   
106 Christians, supra note 102. FFIs must perform due diligence to determine whether any customers are U.S. 
citizens. After doing so, they must require their potential American customers to sign a withholding certificate 
(Form W-8BEN) claiming that they are not a U.S. citizen, under perjury of law.  They must also request from the 
customers a certified copy of his or her certificate of loss of nationality.  They must then determine whether the 
customer is a reportable account, and report the required information to the IRS.  IRS Form w-8BEN, IRS, available 
at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw8ben.pdf.  
107 Srinivas, supra note 104.  
108 Id. “Scared of running afoul of US banking laws, foreign banks are taking extreme steps to limit US citizens to a 
narrow range of services.” 
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citizenships in order to either avoid the strict reporting requirements imposed by FATCA, or to 
better live a normal lifestyle in their resident country.109  Since the implementation of FATCA, 
each year has resulted in more expatriates than ever before.110 
 There has also been concern about the primarily unilateral approach of FATCA and its 
impact on international relations.111  FATCA essentially forces foreign countries and their 
financial entities into aiding the U.S. in implementing its tax laws, giving them the options to 
either comply with the statute, or forego access to the U.S. markets.112  While the U.S. generally 
enjoys a level of respect internationally, the implementation of FATCA can have a negative 
impact on the relations between the U.S. and foreign countries.113 
 Finally, many are unsure of whether the benefits of increasing revenue compliance 
outweigh the burdens of heavy implementation costs.  While it is predicted that FATCA will aid 
the IRS in collecting an additional $800 million annually, compliance costs may average 
approximately $5 million to $10 million per FFI.114  This results in roughly $1 trillion to $2 
trillion in global compliance costs.115 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109 Id.  
110 See, supra note 3 for numbers of expatriations by year. 
111 Deneault, supra note 47, at 755.   
112 Id. 
113 Id.  “ Understandably, the international community does not appreciate an actor who unilaterally imposes its will 
onto other countries to effectuate domestic policies.” 
114 Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 111th Congress, Estimated Revenue Effects of the Revenue Provisions 
Contained in an Amendment to the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 
2847, The “Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act”, JCX-6-10 (2010), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3650; Frank Suess, How Does FATCA Impact You?, 
THE DAILY BELL http://www.thedailybell.com/editorials/frank-suess-how-does-fatca-impact-you/ (Oct. 4, 2012).   
115 Seuss, supra note 114.  
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2. A Move Toward Global Transparency 
 While the implementation of FATCA resulted in substantial criticisms, many of those 
initial criticisms have either not occurred as expected or have not yet occurred.116  Alternatively, 
instead of resulting in a global crisis, FATCA has actually inspired other jurisdictions to further 
the notion of global tax transparency.117  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) has modeled its development of the Common Reporting Standard 
(“CRS”) after the objectives of FATCA.118  The CRS was designed to “prevent the development 
of numerous competing standards for information exchange, and in doing so minimise potential 
costs and administrative burden for the financial sector.”119   
 Similarly to FATCA, the CRS requires financial institutions of participating jurisdictions 
to report information on its account holders of other participating jurisdictions, which requires 
due diligence procedures in order to identify reportable accounts.120 Additionally, the CRS 
requires institutions to enter into agreements similar to the FATCA IGA in its efforts of 
achieving global exchange of information.121  However, this global move toward global 
transparency comes with different requirements than the requirements of FATCA, with a broader 
                                                          
116 My research leads me to believe that there has not yet been sufficient studies or data on the treatment of overseas 
Americans by FFIs, or what the actual costs of compliance have been for FFIs since the implementation of the 
FATCA requirements.   
117 Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information: Common Reporting Standard [hereinafter 
Standard], OECD, 5   available at https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-
financial-account-information-common-reporting-standard.pdf.  
118 Id. at 44. “The new standard draws extensively on earlier work of the OECD in the area of automatic exchange of 
information.  It incorporates progress made within the European Union, as well as global anti-money laundering 
standards, with the intergovernmental implementation of the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
having acted as a catalyst for the move towards automatic exchange of information in a multilateral context.” 
119 Charles Yorke & David Stainer, UK ‘son of FATCA’ and recent information exchange proposals, TAX PLANNING 
INTERNATIONAL EUROPEAN TAX SERVICE, 3 
http://clientlink.allenovery.com/lncreative_preview/UK_son_of_FATCA_and_recent_information_%20exchange_p
roposals.pdf.  
120 Standard, supra note 117, at 10-11. 
121 See, Id. at 12 for a model agreement under the CRS. 
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scope and no threshold for reporting requirements.122  This means that some companies may find 
themselves in compliance with FATCA, but not under the CRS.123 
3. Crawford et al v. U.S. Department of Treasury 
 In September 2015, Senator Rand Paul, Mark Crawford, and others brought suit against 
the U.S. Department of Treasury for injunctive relief, claiming that FATCA is 
unconstitutional.124  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that FATCA’s Intergovernmental 
Agreements are unconstitutional sole executive agreements; that the account reporting 
requirements are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and under the Equal Protection 
Clause; and that its penalties are unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.125 
 In an order denying the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief based on a lack 
of standing, the constitutional challenges were only briefly discussed.126  After determining that 
only one of the seven plaintiffs had standing, the Court limited its discussion to of the claims that 
applied to the plaintiff with standing.127 
 The court held that the challenge to the heightened reporting requirements for foreign 
financial accounts as denying U.S. citizens living abroad the equal protection of the laws would 
fail because the challenged provisions do not actually single out Americans living abroad, 
because the statute applies to all Americans with offshore accounts, regardless of residence.128  It 
                                                          
122 Laurence Kiddle, The differences between FATCA and CRS, ECONOMIA, (Sept. 9, 2015) 
http://economia.icaew.com/finance/september-2015/the-differences-between-facta-and-crs.  
123 Id. 
124 Crawford v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 3:15-CV-250, 2015 WL 5697552 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 
2015). 
125 Id. 
126Id. at *16.  “[Plaintiffs] lack standing, as the harms they allege are remote and speculative harms, most of which 
would be caused by third parties, illusory, or self-inflicted.” 
127 Id. at *11-14.  The only Plaintiff with standing (Daniel Kuettel) was limited to the claim that the heightened 
reporting requirements for foreign financial accounts denied U.S. citizens living abroad the equal protection of the 
law, and the claim that the willfulness penalty is unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines clause. 
128 Id. at *13.   
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was further held that the statute is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of addressing 
offshore tax evasion and closing the gap between taxes due and taxes paid.129 
 The court also addressed the challenge to the penalty as unconstitutional under the 
Excessive Fines Clause, which the plaintiff claimed was “designed to punish” and “grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.”130  It was held that the Eighth Amendment claims 
were not ripe for adjudication since no withholding penalty had been imposed, nor would it ever 
be since the plaintiffs are individuals, not FFIs.131 
 The following analysis will focus on a constitutional challenge under the Fourth 
Amendment, which was not discussed in the Crawford decision but for a statement that the 
counts “are based on information reporting that does not violate the Constitution.”132 
IV. Constitutional Analysis 
 This section will analyze the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act in a constitutional 
capacity, specifically under the Fourth Amendment.  It will begin with the United States 
Supreme Court precedent relevant to the analysis.  It will then argue that reporting requirements 
of FATCA are an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Supreme Court Precedent 
 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated...”133  A search or seizure by a Government agent will be violated under the Fourth 
Amendment when, in order to obtain information, a search or seizure physically intrudes on a 
protected area or item, or, when the search or seizure implicates an individual’s reasonable 
                                                          
129 Id. at *14.  
130 Crawford, WL 5697552, at *14. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at *16. 
133 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
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expectation of privacy.134  The following case law is the Supreme Court precedent relative to a 
discussion on the constitutional analysis of FATCA under the Fourth Amendment. 
 The court in Katz set forth the test for an expectation of privacy, which moved the 
analysis away from the traditional trespass test that had been exclusively relied on until then.135  
After Government agents placed an electronic listening device on a public phone booth in order 
to listen to the conversation, the court held that the Fourth Amendment was violated.136  
Although the individual had taken his phone call to a public area, the court held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and not things, and noted that even though something is brought 
into the public area, it can remain private if the individual takes steps to ensure this.137  The 
concurring opinion set forth the two prongs later adopted as the “expectation of privacy test,” 
which asks 1) whether the individual had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) 
whether that expectation of privacy is reasonably accepted by society.138 
 In California Bankers Association v. Shultz, the court was required to determine the 
constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, which, not dissimilar to FATCA, required 
financial institutions to “maintain records of their customers’ identities, to make microfilm 
copies of checks and similar instruments, and to keep records of certain other items.”139  In 
determining that the recordkeeping did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the court held that the 
                                                          
134 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).   
135 Katz, 389 U.S. 347 at 352 “[o]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people – and not simply 
‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn 
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.” 
136 Id. at 359. 
137 Id. at 351.  In this case, the petitioner brought his conversation to a public phone booth.  While it was in the 
public eye, being a clear booth, it was held that the petitioner “sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not 
the intruding eye – it was the uninvited ear.  He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made calls from a 
place where he might be seen.”     
138 Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
139 California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).   
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provisions did not require any information contained in the records to be disclosed to the 
government, because access to the records “is to be controlled by existing legal processes.”140 
 In regards to the reporting requirements of the Act, which required the report of anyone 
connected to a foreign transaction exceeding $5,000, the court held that they “do not authorize 
indiscriminate rummaging among the records of the plaintiffs.”141  The court further held that 
“[t]he reports of foreign financial transactions required by the regulation must contain 
information as to a relatively limited group of financial transactions in foreign commerce, and 
are reasonably related to the statutory purpose of assisting in the enforcement of the laws of the 
United States.”142 
 Dissenting, Justice Douglas noted, “a person is defined by the checks he writes.”143  He 
went on to describe the personal information that could be derived from bank records, such as 
“the doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connection, religious affiliation, 
educational interests, and the papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum.”144  Justice 
Douglas discusses the expectation of privacy in bank records and states that what a person “seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”145  He then asserts that bank accounts are within the expectations of privacy due to 
the information that they reveal in addition to a person’s finances.146  He further notes that just 
because the bank records are useful in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, 
                                                          
140 Id. at 52. 
141 Id. at 62. 
142 Id. 
143 California Bankers, 416 U.S. 21 at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 89. 
146 Id.  
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that the collection of all citizens must be collected in saying that it is “unadulterated nonsense 
unless we are to assume that every citizen is a crook, an assumption I cannot make.”147 
 Justice Marshall delivers another dissent, in which he states that even though a person 
discloses private papers to the bank, it does not waive the right to privacy of the papers, because 
it is offered to the bank for a limited purpose under a confidential customer-bank relationship.  
He further notes that a customer of a bank “has a reasonable expectation that his check will be 
examined for bank purposes only – to credit, debit, or balance his account – and not recorded and 
kept on file for several years by Government decree so that it can be available for Government 
scrutiny.”148 
 The court in U.S. v. Miller further examined the Bank Secrecy Act when it addressed 
records maintained under the act that were obtained by allegedly defective subpoenas.149  In 
holding that the records obtained were business records of the banks, the court noted that the 
banks are not neutral, but are parties to the transactions.150  Additionally, the court noted, a lack 
of expectation of privacy in bank records was assumed by Congress in its enactment of the Bank 
Secrecy Act.151  Furthermore, the court held that the depositor assumes the risk of his personal 
information being conveyed to the Government when revealing the information to a third party, 
“even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”152 
 Justice Brennan dissented, asserting that bank customers have reasonable expectations 
that their documents transmitted in the course of business will remain private, and that “[a] bank 
customer’s reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he 
                                                          
147 Id. at 85. 
148 California Bankers, 416 U.S. 21 at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
149 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
150 Id. at 440. 
151 Id. at 442. 
152 Id. at 443. 
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reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes.”153  In 
addition, he notes that it is “impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary 
society without maintaining a bank account,” for which the depositor must reveal many aspects 
of his personal life.154  Justice Brennan goes on to describe the potential abuse of police power 
by allowing access to the records upon request, with no judicial process to review and balance 
the societal and individual interests.155 
 The court in Smith v. Maryland held that the installation and use of a pen register, which 
revealed to the government the telephone numbers dialed from a suspect’s home phone did not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.156  Since the installation of the pen register 
occurred at the phone company, and not the home of the petitioner, it was clear that no property 
had been invaded.157  Therefore, in making its determination, the court was required to determine 
whether the petitioner had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed 
from his home phone.158 
 In applying the Katz test, the Smith court first noted that the pen register only revealed the 
numbers dialed from a specific phone, but did not reveal any content of the conversations spoken 
during the call, or whether a communication even occurred.159  The court went on to note that 
telephone users knowingly convey phone numbers to the telephone company, which are then 
used in the billing process.160  Therefore, customers generally do not have an expectation that the 
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numbers they dial will remain secret, as they have assumed the risk of government disclosure by 
releasing their information to a third party.161 
 In a dissent delivered by Justice Stewart, it was asserted that telephone subscribers would 
not be happy to “have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they 
have called.”162  It is further noted that the numbers dialed can reveal personal or incriminating 
information by revealing the identities of the persons called “and thus reveal[ing] the most 
intimate details of a person’s life.”163  Further, a dissent delivered by Justice Marshall rebutted 
the assumption of risk customers providing their information to a third party.164  In doing so, 
Justice Marshall discusses the lack of choice in the situation, stating that a customer “cannot help 
but accept the risk of surveillance” where there is no practical alternative.165 
 The Fourth Amendment analysis in U.S. v. Jones revolved around the installation of a 
GPS device onto a suspect’s car in order to monitor his movements.166  The majority held that 
the physical intrusion to the vehicle constituted the installation as a violation to the Fourth 
Amendment.167  Concurring opinions also held that a violation occurred, but they did so through 
an expectation of privacy analysis.  In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor discussed the 
new age of technology and its impact on society’s expectations of privacy when disclosing 
information to third parties.168  She notes, “people disclose a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks,” such as phone numbers 
to phone providers or URL and email addresses to internet providers.169  She asserts that 
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although some believe people accept the “tradeoff of privacy for convenience” as “worthwhile” 
or “inevitable,” it is doubtful that anyone would accept disclosure of a list of every website that 
they visit.170  She further states that all information voluntarily disclosed for a limited purpose 
should not waive someone’s entitlement to Fourth Amendment protection.171 
 In a further concurrence, Justice Alito mentions the circularity involved in the 
expectation of privacy test, stating that “judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of 
privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person.”172  He also believes that changes in 
technology and availability of cheaper access and newer devices can change society’s 
expectations of privacy.173  Further, Justice Alito discusses the implications of the length of time 
of the surveillance.174  He states that the expectations of privacy are affected because society 
would not expect law enforcement agencies to secretly monitor their every movement for a 
prolonged period, which was approximately four weeks in Jones.175   
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis 
 The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act requires that foreign financial institutions 
report specific information on all of its accounts held by U.S. citizens with an aggregate balance 
of $50,000 during the taxable year.176  The information that must be reported includes the name 
and address of the account holder, as well as the account number and balance, withdrawals, or 
payments from the account.177  The FFI must report this information on each of its American 
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accounts on an annual basis, or it will be subject to a thirty percent withholding tax on all 
withholdable payments.178 
1. The Reporting Requirements are Searches Under the Fourth Amendment 
 In beginning a constitutional analysis of FATCA, it must first be determined whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to the reporting requirements.  Since there is no physical intrusion on 
a protected area or item, the test to be applied is set forth in Katz, which asks whether the search 
or seizure implicates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.179  Specifically, the 
analysis asks whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information reported 
under FATCA requirements. 
 First, it had been asserted by the Government in the Crawford case, that under FATCA, 
no search exists because FATCA does not actually “require” the FFIs to report the information 
and “it simply imposes a tax on FFIs that choose not to report certain information.”180  However, 
it is clear that FFIs are required to report their client information.  As stated by an IRS official, 
even if a dollar of the withholding tax is not collected, FATCA will be considered a success in its 
efforts to compel compliance.181 The withholding tax that is imposed on nonparticipating FFIs 
was implemented as a way to enforce compliance with reporting requirements.  Furthermore, the 
withholding penalty does not realistically create an option for the FFIs.  While it may seem 
simple on its face to either report the information or pay the withholding tax, the thirty percent 
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withholding is quite steep, making noncompliance financially impossible for many FFIs to 
endure.182 
 In concluding that the reporting requirements are, in fact, requirements, it must next be 
determined whether there is a privacy interest in that information required.  While it has been 
held that bank records do not hold a privacy interest, before assuming this position, a further 
analysis of the records at hand will lead to the conclusion that there is a privacy interest in the 
records required by FATCA.183 
 FATCA requires FFIs to report sensitive information of their U.S. account holders, 
including personal information of the account holder, the account number and balance, as well as 
the aggregate gross amounts of interests and income paid or credited to the account.184  This 
reporting requirement is not like that of a pen register, which only reveals the numbers dialed 
from a specific phone.185  Instead, this is sensitive information relating to a person’s financial 
activity.  As mentioned in the dissents from both California Bankers and Miller, bank records 
can reveal much more personal information than the depositor’s financial activity.186  This is 
because by looking at bank records such as account statements or checks, one can derive much 
about a person’s personal life based on the items and services paid for through that account.  
However, while the information reported under FATCA is sensitive information based on 
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personal financial activity, it is less likely to lead the Government to realize other personal 
aspects of the individual than would be realized from an individual’s bank statement.187 
 It has been held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information that has been 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to the Government.188  Under FATCA, individuals 
reveal their financial information to the banks, which then must report said information to the 
IRS.189  However, there is more to the equation at hand than simply entrusting someone with 
private information in hopes they will not report it.  When a customer creates an account at a 
financial institution, he has the reasonable expectation that the information disclosed is going to 
be used for bank purposes only, and not to be tracked and recorded for Government purposes.190  
The banker-customer relationship is one that is generally understood as a confidential one.191  
Additionally, in order to participate as a functioning citizen, it is essential to maintain a bank 
account.192  However, in order to access a bank account, an individual is required to reveal his 
personal information.193  Essentially, citizens are societally forced into maintaining a bank 
account, but then told that they have voluntarily waived their Fourth Amendment rights by doing 
so, since it has been held that there is no expectation of privacy in bank records. 
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 Finally, the reporting requirements can be compared to the GPS monitoring in Jones.194  
FACTA requires FFIs to continuously track their customers, and annually report the information 
on each U.S. account.195  The Jones concurrence noted that the long-term tracking of the 
individual contravened his Fourth Amendment right because society would not expect the 
constant monitoring.196  While FATCA does not track the geographical movements of 
individuals, it is a long-term tracking of a person’s financial activity as long as they hold a 
foreign account.197 
 While the required information to be reported by FFIs under FATCA may not reveal the 
utmost personal characteristics of the individual account holders, there is generally an 
expectation that account information be kept private in the banker-customer relationship.  The 
compulsory information reporting infringes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and this 
must be found reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.198 
2. The Searches are Unreasonable Under the Fourth Amendment 
 After assuming that a search has in fact triggered the Fourth Amendment by infringing on 
an individual’s expectation of privacy, the next step of the analysis is to determine whether the 
search was reasonable.  The searches in California Banking were considered reasonable because 
the banks were only required to report certain transactions and they were sufficiently related to 
criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations.199  FATCA, however, requires the reporting of all 
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U.S. foreign accounts.200  The FATCA reporting requirements arguably resemble that of a 
general search warrant.  It was enacted in order to curb tax evasion of U.S. citizens using foreign 
accounts.  However, while the information reported can be useful to the IRS in confirming the 
income reported by individuals, there are no particularized suspicions in collecting this 
information from every foreign U.S. account.  Doing so assumes that every U.S. citizen with a 
foreign account is a “crook” evading his taxes.201  Additionally, the searches at hand contain the 
potential for abuse.  This is due to the “access to this information without invocation of the 
judicial process.”202  The scrutiny of a neutral magistrate helps to balance societal and individual 
interests in the collection of the information at hand.203  Without a warrant issued through the 
judicial process, the search is an unreasonable violation of the individual account holders’ Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
3. Standing 
 It is worth noting that in order to properly challenge FATCA, an individual must have 
standing, which is why the constitutional challenge was not discussed further in the Crawford 
case.204  The court in Rakas v. Illinois held that Fourth Amendment rights are “personal in 
nature” and one does not have standing to challenge the invasion of another’s property or 
privacy.205  This brings us to a discussion on the first prong of the Katz expectation of privacy 
test.  The above analysis discusses the expectation of privacy of a reasonable person.  However, 
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an individual must first prove that he had an actual and subjective expectation of privacy.206  
Therefore, in order for an individual to have standing to challenge FATCA under the Fourth 
Amendment, it is first necessary for him to have a foreign financial account at an FFI that then 
reports the required personal account information to the IRS.   
V. Tweaking FATCA: A Solution 
 If FATCA is upheld as constitutional, does that mean that it is good for U.S. citizens?  
The automatic reporting by FFIs on individual account holder information infringes upon 
individuals’ protection under the Fourth Amendment by requiring FFIs to report information 
about its American account holders to the IRS.  
 A potential solution to ease this problem is to remove the automatic reporting 
requirement of FFIs.  This will bring FATCA closer to the scope of California Bankers by 
requiring FFIS to simply maintain the records.207  The reporting requirements should still be 
implemented on the individual level.  However, the IRS’s receipt of the records from FFIs could 
be left to the “existing legal process” by requiring the IRS to utilize search warrants for specific 
accounts.208  The IRS would be able to cross-check the information reported by individuals with 
the account information held by the FFIS, while allowing for a neutral magistrate to properly 
balance the interests of society and the individual on a case-by-case basis.  Additionally, this will 
require a more particularized suspicion before the IRS can receive the information. 
This solution may not further the efforts of tax compliance to the extent that the IRS is 
seeking.  It brings with it some of the issues found with the Qualified Intermediary programs 
with the lack of an automatic reporting.  However, the constitutional rights of American citizens 
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should be prioritized over the loss of revenue that is caused by only a fraction of those citizens 
under reach of the statute.209  Under this regime, the FFIs would still hold the required 
information for a number of years, and would make it available upon request through the use of a 
warrant.  The IRS would still be able to check on the information being reported by individuals, 
and in doing so would still be in compliance with the constitutional rights of United States 
citizens. 
VI. Conclusion 
 The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act was implemented as a solution to curb 
offshore tax evasion.  However, instead of specifically targeting tax evaders, the strict, automatic 
reporting requirements have led to a sharp increase in expatriates, and will potentially lead to 
further setbacks for the U.S. economy and foreign relations.  Furthermore, it is arguably 
unconstitutional as an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 
 While there is a significant need to prevent offshore tax evasion in order to increase tax 
compliance, FATCA is not the proper tool to do so.  The burdens of FATCA significantly 
outweigh the benefits.  FATCA generalizes all Americans with foreign accounts and imposes 
requirements that infringe upon the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.  FATCA should be 
repealed, or at least modified in a way that better achieves its targets of those U.S. citizens using 
offshore accounts to evade taxes, while protecting the Fourth Amendment Constitutional rights 
of U.S. citizens. 
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